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Abstract  The purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) accession of eight Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) on their share in EMU-12 imports.  Overcoming 
biases related to endogeneity, omitted variables and sample selection, our 
results indicate that the common currency has boosted intra-EMU imports by 
7%. Under the assumption that the same relationship between the explanatory 
variables and imports will  hold for EMU-CEEC trade, we are able to predict 
the future impact of the euro. Our findings suggest that except for the least 
integrated countries, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, all  CEECs can expect 
increases in the EMU-12 import share. 
 
JEL-codes F15, F41 
Keywords Central and Eastern European countries, Euro area enlargement, 
gravity model, panel estimation. 
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I MOTIVATION 
 
As a result of the European Commission’s convergence report in May 2006, 
Slovenia was the first of the new European Union (EU) member states to 
adopt the euro. Other countries will  follow in the course of the upcoming 
years. While research of exchange rate regimes traditionally focused on its 
consequences for the macroeconomic performance of countries (see Ghosh, 
Gulde and Wolf,  2002 for an exhaustive overview), a more recent line of 
research draws attention to the real impacts of exchange rate issues (e.g. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992 and 1998 and Frankel and Rose, 1998 for the 
effects on business cycle synchronization and Belke and Gros, 2002 and 
Belke and Setzer, 2003 for labour market effects).  In a controversial but 
highly influential  paper, Rose (2000) assessed the contribution of currency 
unions in promoting international trade. His point estimate of a 3.35 times 
higher trade volume with a common currency compared to the baseline 
scenario without a common currency has been subject to much critique. In a 
recent paper, Baldwin (2006) summarizes follow-up studies and specifically 
points his crit ique to possible estimation biases related to omitted variables, 
endogeneity and sample selection.  
Among the numerous papers trying to reduce the “Rose effect”, only 
few dealt explicitly with the euro area. The first studies by Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez (2002) and Flam and Nordstrom (2003) estimate respectively 6% and 
8% more trade among Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) members 
compared to other EU member states. Controlling for the general trend of 
greater economic integration among the euro area countries over the past five 
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decades, Berger and Nitsch (2005) find the EMU effect even disappearing 
completely.  
However, there are very few authors that point to the trade effects of 
the forthcoming EMU enlargement.1 While trade barriers between the old and 
new EU member states had already been removed during the 1990s, sharing a 
common currency may further deepen real economic integration. Empirical 
findings on intra-EMU trade effects of the introduction of the euro by the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)2 are of high interest for 
politicians and for researchers in the field of Optimum Currency Areas 
(OCAs) at least for two reasons: First ,  they may have important policy 
implications. If a common currency boosts trade even among highly 
integrated regions, currency unions become more attractive, and hence, 
European Central Bank (ECB) and government authorities may encourage 
applicants to execute all  necessary steps for an early adoption of the euro. 
Second, any increase in euro area trade resulting from an EMU enlargement 
provides empirical support for Rose’s finding that establishing a common 
currency stimulates trade among union members substantially. 
We start this study by applying a specification that accounts for recent 
insights into the theoretical foundation as well as the appropriate econometric 
set-up of gravity models. While earlier studies only used time-invariant 
country pair fixed effects to address the price terms, as emphasized by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we correct for the remaining omitted 
variable bias by also incorporating time-variant multilateral resistance to 
trade. As suggested by Egger (2002) and Carrère (2006), we apply the 
                                                 
1 We are only aware of  the s tudies  by Maliszewska (2004)  and Brouwer,  van Dijk  and 
Viaene (2007) deal ing with th is  issue empir ical ly.  
2 In  th is  paper ,  we conceive the CEECs as  the group formed by the Balt ic  States  (Estonia ,  
Latvia  and Lithuania) ,  Czech Republic ,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  and Slovenia.  
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Hausman-Taylor (HT) instrumental variables estimator to account for any 
possible endogeneity of Right Hand Side (RHS) variables, and specifically 
the EMU dummy. Further, we use the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
(FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007), which has – to 
our knowledge – never been applied before in the context of gravity 
modelling. Both techniques have the great advantage of allowing for an 
estimation of the traditional time-invariant gravity variables, such as distance 
and language while controlling for the unobserved individual effects in an 
efficient way.  
Based on our estimates of the early impact of the euro on intra-EMU 
imports,  we aim to assess the implications of the EMU accession of eight 
CEECs on their share in the twelve current EMU member states’ imports as of 
end-of-year 2004. Assuming that the same relationship between income, 
distance, common borders and other country characteristics and bilateral trade 
will  hold for future EMU member states, we calculate the potential import 
increases following the accession of the CEECs to the euro area. Our 
predictions based on the parameters estimated out-of-sample suggest that 
except for the least integrated countries Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, all  
CEECs can expect further gains in the EMU-12 import share once they adopt 
the euro.  
After developing some stylized facts in section 2, we continue 
elucidating the specification of the gravity equation we are going to test 
(section 3). The description of the applied econometric methods and the data 
set (section 4) is followed by the interpretation of the estimation results in 
section 5. Section 6 contains a summary as well as policy implications of the 
obtained results.    
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II DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE FLOWS: STYLIZED FACTS 
 
We start with some stylized facts concerning trade flows between the euro 
area and the Central and Eastern European EU member countries. For this 
purpose, Figure 1 plots the EMU-12 and the EU-15 imports from the CEECs 
between 1991 and 2004. The figure conveys first  empirical evidence of a 
parallel  increase in the import values of the EU-15 and the EMU-12 from the 
CEECs over the past 15 years.3 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
While there has been a steady rise in the import value over the 1990s, 
one can observe a higher growth rate imminently prior to the EU accession of 
the eight CEECs. Even though all obstacles to free trade have been fully 
removed, sharing a single currency may stimulate real integration further by 
reducing the transaction costs involved in trade.  
 A simple calculation helps to portray the relative change in intra-EMU 
trade and intra-EU trade. To render the sizes of the two geographical regions 
comparable, the respective yearly import values have been normalized with 
regard to the base year (1997). Taking the quotient allows then to assess 
relative changes. To be precise, the development of intra-EMU imports 
                                                 
3 Clear ly,  the EMU-12 is  much more important  for  the CEECs than the o ther  way around.  
Due to restr ic t ions concerning the avai labi l i ty of  t rade data ,  we are  constrained to  look at  
EMU-12 imports  f rom the CEECs.  
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( EMUM ) and intra-EU imports ( EUM ) since 1997 has been calculated as 
follows: 
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Looking at Figure 2, it  can be readily seen that the increase of intra-
EMU imports has been over 5% higher than the rise of intra-EU imports 
during the same period. After an initial slowdown in 1999, the EMU 
experienced an especially strong relative increment in 2001, when Greece 
entered the currency union, and in 2003. The graph also suggests an 
announcement effect,  since intra-EMU imports already increased relative to 
intra-EU imports in the two years before the formal adoption of the common 
currency. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The crude figure seems to roughly confirm prior studies which provide 
estimates mostly in the range of 5 to 10% (Baldwin, 2006). However, the 
graph also shows that it  is crucial to include the most recent year available,  
since much of the increase in imports only occurred since 2002. 
Based on the euro area imports over the CEECs’ GDP ratio, Figure 3 
gives a visual impression of the degree of euro area openness of the CEECs in 
the year 2004. According to the standard textbook version of OCA theory, an 
already high degree of economic integration among prospective members of a 
currency bloc promises higher efficiency gains and lower stability losses from 
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adopting a common currency.4 Thus, Figure 3 suggests that the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary should benefit most from their individual 
EMU accession since the euro area displays a high trade exposure towards 
them. However, the seminal study by Frankel and Rose (1998) challenged the 
OCA textbook view by stressing the possibility of endogenous currency 
unions. They argue that two countries would move even closer to match the 
OCA criteria once they share a common currency. Consequently, i t  seems 
equally apt to argue a priori that the rise of imports due to the euro adoption 
is expected to be higher for countries that have not yet exploited their full 
trade potential with the current EMU member states. Based on this different 
variant of OCA theory, Figure 3 indicates that Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 
were in 2004 relatively less open towards trading with the EMU-12 and may 
therefore expect a bigger trade effect from the euro. Which view is correct, is 
a purely empirical question. We leave the answer to our econometric 
investigation. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Seen on the whole, the stylized facts match our a priori  expectations 
well.  While the imports of the EU-15 and the euro area from the CEECs have 
developed synchronously up to now, those EU member states that share a 
common currency seem to trade relatively more with each other than with 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK. This result at the outset argues in favour of a 
similar development in case of the EMU accession of the CEECs, thus calling 
for a more formal investigation. 
                                                 
4 For  a  comprehensive discussion,  see Gros and Thygesen (1998).  
-7- 
 
 
 
 
III EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
We estimate a log-linearised reduced-form gravity equation of the form  
 
ijtijijijtjtitijt EMUZdreYYM 654321 lnlnlnlnln ββββββα ++++++=
 ijtijtijijijt avEMUavZavdavre εββββ +++++ 10987 lnln                       (2) 
 
where itY  is the importer’s GDP influencing its import demand, jtY  is the 
exporter’s GDP influencing its export supply, ijtre  stands for the real 
exchange rate5 and ijd  is the great-circle distance between the importing and 
the exporting country.6 ijZ  represents a set of dummy variables serving as 
proxies for country i’s trade costs. To be precise, we consider whether 
country i or j  are landlocked (ll) and whether they share a common border 
(border) or language (cl) as factors hampering or facilitating trade. Finally,  
ijtEMU  represents a dummy variable measuring Mundell’s proposal of a single 
medium of exchange reducing transaction costs and thereby facilitating 
international trade (Mundell,  1961). The variable takes the value of 1 for both 
countries of a trading pair being EMU members and 0 otherwise. We set this 
variable in the first set of regressions (Table 1) – accounting also for a 
possible announcement effect – over the period 1998-2004. In the second set 
                                                 
5 A r ise in  the  real  exchange ra te  implies a  depreciat ion of  country i’s  currency against  
country j ’s  currency.  
6 See Table A.1  for  var iable  def in i t ions and sources.  
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of regressions (Table 2), we introduce yearly EMU dummies to see in which 
years the common currency impact has been strongest.   
As stated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade does not 
solely depend on bilateral trade costs, but also on the average resistance to 
trade with the Rest of the World (ROW). To account for this finding, we 
introduce the correspondent multilateral term to all variables that facilitate or 
hamper bilateral trade. To be precise, multilateral resistance (MR) is given by 
the sum of average bilateral resistances (BR) of countries i  (j) towards all  
trading partners except for the specific trading partner j  (i).7 
 
∑∑
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Since the ijtavEMU  variable is supposed to capture the trade effects of 
the common currency on outside countries, i t  is set to 0 for all  EMU member 
states.8 The parameter coefficients of the multilateral trade cost variables are 
expected to take the opposite sign of their bilateral counterparts. Hence, the 
bigger a trading pair’s joint resistance to trade with the ROW, the lower the 
bilateral trade costs relative to the multilateral trade costs and the larger 
country i’s imports from country j.  For the ijtavre  this means, that holding the 
bilateral real exchange rate between country i and country j constant,  a 
depreciation of country i’s currency with respect to all other currencies in the 
sample, pushes country i to import from country j.  Since a part of the 
                                                 
7 Since taking the sum of the average exchange ra tes  of  both trading par tners  would have 
offset t ing  effects ,  we consider  in th is  case  s imply the average exchange ra te  of  country i  
towards al l  t rading par tners  except the par t icular  trading partner  j .    
8 We addi t ional ly control  for  par t ic ipat ion in  the  EU and in the European Agreements  
(EAs)  and def ine the mult i la teral  counterparts  of  these two variables  in  the same way as  
the average EMU dummy.  
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multilateral variables does not only change cross-sectionally but also over 
time (e.g. the average exchange rate), we are able to remove biases present in 
studies that only include country (pair) fixed effects to describe Anderson and 
van Wincoop’s (2003) price terms. To summarize, the expected coefficient 
signs are   
.0,0,0,0
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
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Finally, we overcome a possible selection bias by including three 
variables that approximate the Heckman correction term: HC1 is a variable 
containing the number of years of a trading pair in the sample. HC2 and HC3 
are dummies, taking the value of 1 if the trading pair is observed over the 
entire period 1991 to 2004 and if the trading pair is present in the sample in t-
1, respectively (and 0 otherwise).   By this,  we leave ample room within the 
estimation for the basic insight that a great number of bilateral trade 
relationships are not utilized, meaning that they involve no trade (the so-
called extensive margin of trade, Felbermayr and Kohler, 2007). 
 
   
IV ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
4.1 General remarks 
 
The estimations are based on a panel data set containing all countries being 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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(OECD) over the period 1991 to 2004 – including also those CEECs which 
have already joined (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) – 
plus Romania and Bulgaria and the four CEECs (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia) that have not yet become full  OECD members.  
The advantages of using panel data in the context of this study are 
straightforward. They allow capturing relevant relationships between 
variables over time and monitoring unobservable country pair individual 
effects. Cheng and Wall (2004) demonstrate that not controlling for country 
pair heterogeneity yields biased estimates. The country pair effects will  be 
treated as fixed, since the Random Effects (RE) model only yields consistent 
estimates when the unobservable bilateral effects are not correlated with the 
error term. The conducted Hausman test,  however, rejected the null-
hypothesis of no correlation. The relevant Fixed Effects (FE) regression thus 
gives unbiased estimates of the time-varying variables (reported in column 2 
of Table 1 and 2). The first drawback of this procedure is well-known: Since 
the within-groups estimator ignores the between-groups variance, estimates 
for the time-invariant explanatory variables cannot be provided. Only very 
recently, researchers have started discussing a second drawback: Although 
coefficients are provided for variables that are hardly changing over time, the 
FE absorbs most of their explanatory power and estimates of these variables 
become inefficient (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). Since we attach importance 
to the estimation of time-invariant (e.g. distance) and almost time-invariant 
variables (e.g. the EMU dummy), we apply two further techniques, the Fixed 
Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator and the Hausman and Taylor 
(HT) estimator, (reported in columns 3 and 4 of both tables, respectively), 
which deal exactly with the points of critique just mentioned. To provide 
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comparability to earlier studies, we also report the results of the Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) regression in column 1 of both tables. We 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in all regressions. The 
Dickey-Fuller test  rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in the exchange 
rate variables.  
 
 
4.2 The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition estimator 
 
The FEVD procedure estimates in the first stage a standard FE model by 
conducting a within-groups transformation,  
 
ijtijtijt XM εδ ~~~ +=                                         (4)  
 
which removes the bilateral effects ijµ  and the time-invariant variables ijT .  
From this, one obtains the estimated unit effects ijµˆ ,  including all time-
invariant variables, the overall  constant term and the mean effects of the 
time-varying variables. In the second stage, ijµˆ  is decomposed into an 
explained part (by the observed time-invariant and rarely changing variables) 
and an unexplained part ijh ,  
 
  ijijij hT += λµˆ .                    (5) 
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In the last stage, the full model including the residual ijh  from stage 
two, but leaving out ijµ  is re-estimated using POLS.9  
 
ijtijijijtijt hTXM ευλδα ++++= ˆ                  (6) 
 
Hence, if the orthogonality assumption between the time-invariant  
variables and the unobserved bilateral effects is correct,  the estimator is 
consistent.  
 
 
4.3 The Hausman and Taylor estimator 
 
Despite the possibility of estimating time-invariant variables via the FEVD 
estimator, methods making use of FE bear limitations when it  comes to the 
calculation of out-of-sample trade flow predictions. Much information needed 
to predict accurately EMU imports from the CEECs is contained in the 
country pair specific terms. The determination of this term for the countries 
not included in the sample when fitt ing the model is arbitrary. This problem 
can be circumvented applying the HT estimator. By using instrumental 
variables to address the problem of correlation of the unobservable bilateral 
effects with some of the explanatory variables (as detected by the Hausman 
test),  the estimator additionally allows controlling for potential endogeneity 
biases caused by RHS variables. In an RE model of the form 
 
                                                 
9 Also,  a t  th is  th ird s tage,  a  robust  var iance-covar iance matr ix is  appl ied to  el iminate  
panel  heteroskedast ic i ty.    
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ijtijijijijtijtijt TTXXM εµλλδδ +++++= 22112211                 (7) 
 
ijtX 1  and ijT1  are 11 k×  and 11 g×  vectors of observations on exogenous variables 
and 
ijtX 2  and ijT2  are 21 k×  and 21 g×  vectors of observations on endogenous 
variables, causing a bias in the standard RE estimation. Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) therefore propose the use of information already contained in the 
model to instrument the endogenous variables. In the first  step, the consistent 
1δ  and 2δ  are used to obtain the within residuals.  Regressing these on ijT1  and 
ijT2 ,  using ijtX1  and ijT1  as instruments, yields intermediate, even though 
consistent estimates of 1λ  and 2λ .  With the two sets of residuals (within and 
overall) it  is possible to estimate the variance components, which are used to 
perform the General Least Squares (GLS) transform. The model is identified 
as long as 21 gk ≥ .  Since the estimator is consistent but not efficient,  we 
correct at this stage the variance-covariance matrix by using standard errors 
that are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The HT 
estimator is then obtained by 
 
ijtijijijijtijtijt TTXXM εµλλδδ ((((((( +++++= 22112211                (8) 
 
using ijtX 1
~ , ijtX 2
~ , ijtX 1 ,  ijtX 2  and ijT1  as instruments, where ω(  represents the 
GLS transform of a variable, ω  stands for the within-groups mean and ω~  for 
the within transform of a variable ω .   
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The selection of variables included in ijtX 2  and ijT2  is not 
straightforward. We follow the proposition by Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
and use economic intuition.10 First,  and in response to the critique by Baldwin 
(2006), we treat the dummy variables for membership in a preferential 
arrangement as endogenous. Thinking in terms of the traditional OCA theory, 
this reasoning may hold for monetary arrangements even more than for trade 
arrangements. Fearing the loss of the exchange rate and an autonomous 
monetary policy as tools to respond to external shocks, policy makers might 
only select into a currency union when the level of integration (here reflected 
by the level of imports) is already high beforehand. In reference to the 
possibility of export-led growth, a second source of endogeneity bias may 
stem from the exporter’s GDP variable. Its simultaneous instrumentation with 
the bilateral exchange rate variable improves the model so much that the 
over-identification test can no longer reject the null of a non-systematic 
difference between the FE and the HT estimator ( 56.1)11(2 =χ ).  However, we 
find that instrumenting the importer’s GDP variable improves the model 
further and fully eliminates the endogeneity bias.11   
 
 
V RESULTS 
 
                                                 
10 The val id i ty of  the  ins truments  can be tes ted.  When the null  of  ∑
=
∞→ =
n
i
ijijtn Xn
p
1
1 0,
1lim µ  
and ∑
=
∞→ =
n
i
ijijn Tn
p
1
1 0,
1lim µ  cannot be rejected,  ijtX 1 and ijT1  are  uncorrela ted with the 
random effect  ijµ  and no fur ther  instrumentation is  needed.  
11 Since the instrumentation of  the trade cost  var iables  could not  fur ther  improve the 
model,  we treat  the t ime- invar iant  HC1 var iable  as  endogenous.  
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The outputs from the regressions on the full country sample are displayed in 
Table 1. The estimates in columns (3) and (4) are consistent and efficient, so 
we refer to them when interpreting the results.  In the FEVD estimation all  
coefficients except for the bilateral real exchange rate and the multilateral 
landlocked and border variable, show the expected sign and are highly 
significant.  The HT estimator turns, once the correlation between the 
regressors and the unobservable country pair effects is properly 
accommodated, the coefficients of some of the time-invariant variables 
(specifically, the bilateral border, landlocked, common language, EU and the 
multilateral common language and EA variable) insignificant.12 The estimates 
of the traditional gravity variables GDP and distance lie within the usual 
range.13 The multilateral counterparts of the bilateral variables are in the 
FEVD regression significant at  the 1%-level and indicate hence, their 
relevance for the gravity estimation. Our consistent EMU estimate indicates 
7% more imports attributable to the introduction of the euro. The result is 
very well in line with our preliminary analysis (compare Figure 2) and just 
amidst the range of estimates found in other post-Rose studies. We believe 
our result also to be reliable with an eye on the fact that the inclusion of 
multilateral variables enables us to remove not only the time-invariant part  of 
the omitted variable bias, but to address additionally the time-varying 
character of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) relative price terms. 
Interestingly enough, the significantly positive average EMU estimate 
indicates that the common currency did not divert trade from non-members – 
on the contrary, outside countries highly profited from trading with the 
                                                 
12 Among others ,  Egger  (2002) f inds a  s imilar  effect  when applying the HT est imator .  
13 As s tated by Anderson (1979) ,  GDP est imates  my sl ight ly d iffer  f rom the theoret ical ly  
predicted uni tary elast ic i ty  due to  the exis tence of  non- tradeable goods.  
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currency bloc. This result does not come unexpectedly. Transitory factors,  
like the appreciation of the euro since 2002 or the relative strength of the US 
and some of the Eastern and Asian economies help explaining why imports 
from outside the euro area have even grown faster than intra-EMU imports 
over the underlying timeframe.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Turning to the regression results with yearly EMU dummies (Table 2), 
one can readily see the robustness of the coefficient estimates. Both, the 
FEVD and the HT estimator confirm the presumption of an announcement 
effect.  In 1998, the prospect of a common currency has already boosted intra-
EMU-12 imports by 8%. The results further suggest a positive impact of the 
euro across all  years until  2002, with the strongest effect on trade in 2001, 
when Greece entered the currency union. In contrast to the descriptive 
statistics graphed in Figure 2, our formal econometric analysis shows that the 
euro did not stimulate trade significantly further since 2003. On the contrary, 
the FEVD estimator even yields significant coefficients indicating a negative 
impact of the euro in last two sample periods. These years correspond to the 
above mentioned appreciation period of the euro. The observation of no 
further gains for member countries in 2003 and 2004 therefore supports the 
result of the multilateral EMU dummy, suggesting that intra-EMU imports 
have to a certain degree been substituted by imports from the ROW.  
 
Table 2 about here 
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In order to predict the impact of EMU accession for the CEECs, we 
construct and investigate two scenarios, both based on a HT regression over 
the entire timeframe 1991-2004: In the baseline scenario we predict the EMU-
12 imports from the CEECs in a world without the euro. In the counterfactual 
scenario, we base our import predictions on the estimated model controlling 
for the EMU. For measuring the EMU impact correctly, a few adjustments 
have to be made: In the counterfactual scenario, the bilateral and the 
multilateral EMU variables take the value of 1 and 0, respectively. In addition 
to this,  we adjust the real exchange rate variable, such that from the time of 
the euro adoption only real changes are allowed whereas the nominal 
exchange rate is held constant. Under the assumption that the same relation 
between the explanatory variables and imports will  hold also for future EMU 
members, we take the coefficients from the fitted model and apply these to 
the CEEC dataset.  To be precise, by using the saved parameter estimates from 
the full country sample (columns one and two in Table 3) and from the 
country sample excluding the CEECs (columns three and four in Table 3) and 
combining these with the observations on the CEECs, we obtain the 
corresponding values for the import variable. Comparing the 2004 forecasts 
on EMU-12 imports of the baseline (without euro) with the counterfactual 
scenario (with euro), we obtain a prediction of the extent to which a future 
EMU accession of the CEECs will further stimulate trade (see Table 3).   
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In fact, the EMU membership will boost EMU-12 imports from five 
(four in the full  sample estimation) CEECs beyond the level attained through 
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their EU accession – Poland, Latvia and Lithuania (and the Slovak Republic) 
cannot expect further gains when adopting the euro.14 The out-of-sample 
predictions of imports (i .e. ,  those based on parameter estimates gained from a 
country sample which does not include the CEECs) broadly confirm the 
direction of the effect of the full  sample. Given the results for the multilateral 
EMU dummy variable of Table 1 and 2, the relative low or even negative 
impact of the euro adoption for some countries does not come surprisingly. 
Since trade was not diverted from third countries – on the contrary, they 
benefited even more from the common currency area – the passage to full 
EMU membership may in this setting have a negative effect on their 
performance.  
Table 3 gives some intuition with respect to the hypothesis that the 
EMU impact is higher for well-integrated economies. The negative prediction 
for the less-open Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian economies in both 
regressions clearly speaks in favor of the classical OCA theory. In contrast,  
the simulation results for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the countries with 
the highest imports over GDP ratios reveal a relatively low EMU impact and 
strengthen, therefore, the validity of the OCA endogeneity hypothesis 
(compare Figure 3). We also investigated the issue on a more formal level.  
For this purpose, we conducted a Spearman rank correlation analysis of the 
relation between the ranking of the CEECs concerning trade openness in 2004 
and the ranking of these countries with respect to their fictitious gains from 
adopting the euro in 2004 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 about here 
                                                 
14 This  resul t  is  in  contrast  to  a  s tudy by Maliszewska (2004),  who f inds – based on a  
POLS model  –  throughout posi t ive impacts  of  the euro.  
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For both the full  country sample and the out-of-sample scenario there is 
no significant relationship. Only by calculating the rank correlation 
coefficient over the entire time span (1991-2004), we find a significantly 
positive relation between the CEECs’ openness and their gain in the EMU’s 
import share. Hence, there is some evidence that a high degree of openness 
beforehand determines a positive trade impact of EMU membership.   
 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper’s motivation has been twofold: First,  we attempted to address all  
the commonly accepted mistakes in gravity estimation to obtain unbiased 
currency effects on trade. Using the HT estimator we took into account the 
possibility of reverse causality between membership in a currency bloc and 
the import value. By including multilateral time-variant variables we 
corrected for the omitted variable bias present in earlier studies that only rely 
on country pair fixed effects. Finally, with the proxies for the Heckman 
correction term, we addressed the possibility of selection bias. With this 
specification, we obtain a point estimate for the EMU dummy of 0.07, much 
lower than Rose’s result  but well in line with Micco, Stein and Ordoñez 
(2002) and Flam and Nordstrom (2003). Second, we would like to argue that 
our procedure allows deriving some policy implications. As the yearly EMU 
estimates for 2003 and 2004 indicate that the euro did not contribute to any 
increase in imports in these years, i t  seems that the EMU-12 has already 
exhausted its trade-creating potential.  On the one hand, this fact may deliver 
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an argument for current members to opt for a quick entry of the CEECs, once 
they have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria, although their importance for the 
EMU-12 is by far lower than the other way around. On the other hand, the 
Spearman rank correlation suggests that gains from EMU membership are 
larger if the openness towards the euro area has been substantial beforehand. 
The predictions finally suggest that the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Hungary (and Slovakia in the out-of-sample estimation) can expect further 
gains in the EMU-12 import share once they adopt the euro. Therefore, these 
countries, too, may put efforts to fulfill  the accession criteria in the near 
future. 
One task that we have left open for further investigation is the role of 
exchange rate volatility in this kind of models. By implementing a variable 
measuring exchange rate volatility one could control for the exchange rate 
regimes the CEECs have up to today. We leave this task for future research. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: EU and euro area imports from the CEECs 
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Source:  Own calculat ions,  data  f rom OECD. 
 
Figure 2: Increase in intra-EMU imports relative to intra-EU imports 
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Source:  Own calculat ions,  data  f rom OECD. 
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Figure 3: EMU openness of the CEECs in 2004 
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Source:  Own calculat ions,  data  f rom OECD and UN. 
 
Table 1: Estimation results with EMU dummy for the entire period (1998-
2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 POLS FE FEVD HT 
Lngdpim 0  .88*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 
 (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.10)  
Lngdpex 0.89*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
 (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.07)  
Lrer  -0.01 0.13** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.04)  
Ldist  -1 .27***  -1.41*** -1.75*** 
 (0.11)   (0 .00)  (0.16)  
Border  -0.00  0 .00*** -0.00 
 (0.00)   (0 .00)  (0.00)  
Ll  -0.16*  -0.23*** -0.15 
 (0.10)   (0 .00)  (0.13)  
Cl  0.23*  0 .13*** 0.01 
 (0.12)   (0 .00)  (0.15)  
Eu 0.08 0.03 0.03*** 0.03 
 (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
Ea 0.16* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
Emu 0.13** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.07** 
 (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
Lavrer  1.22*** 0.45** 0.45*** 0.45** 
 (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.22)  
Lavdist  0 .55***  0 .93*** 1.45*** 
 (0.15)   (0 .00)  (0.23)  
Avborder  0.00***  0 .01*** 0.01*** 
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 (0 .00)   (0 .00)  (0.00)  
Avll  -0 .10***  -0.14*** -0.18*** 
 (0.03)   (0 .00)  (0.05)  
Avcl  -0.02  -0.40*** -0.45 
 (0.26)   (0 .00)  (0.34)  
Aveu -0.74*** -0.22* -0.22*** -0.22* 
 (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.01)  (0.12)  
Avea 0.34 -0.07 -0.07*** -0.07 
 (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.10)  
Avemu 0.22* 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.08)  
hc1 0.09***  0 .10*** 0.09* 
 (0.03)   (0 .00)  (0.05)  
hc2 0.00    
 (0 .00)     
hc3 -0.18*** -0.03 -0.03*** -0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
Observat ions 5262 5262 5262 5262 
R-squared 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.83 
Robust  s tandard errors  in  parentheses   
*  s ignif icant  a t  10%; ** s ignif icant  a t  5%; *** s ignif icant  a t  1%   
Source:  Own calculat ions.  
 
Table 2: Estimation results with yearly EMU dummies 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 POLS FE FEVD HT 
Lngdpim 0.88*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
 (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.11)  
Lngdpex 0.90*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 
 (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.07)  
Lrer  -0.01 0.13** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.04)  
Ldist  -1 .27***  -1.38*** -1.68*** 
 (0.11)   (0 .00)  (0.16)  
Border  -0.00  0 .00*** -0.00 
 (0.00)   (0 .00)  (0.00)  
Ll  -0.16  -0.20*** -0.15 
 (0.10)   (0 .00)  (0.12)  
Cl  0.23*  0 .15*** 0.05 
 (0.12)   (0 .00)  (0.15)  
Eu 0.06 -0.01 -0.01*** -0.01 
 (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
Ea 0.15 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
emu1998 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.02)  
emu1999 0.24*** 0.05* 0.05*** 0.05* 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
emu2000 0.33*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
emu2001 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
emu2002 0.14** 0.07* 0.07*** 0.07** 
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 (0 .06)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
emu2003 0.01 -0.02 -0.02*** -0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.04)  
emu2004 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07*** -0.07 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
Lavrer  1.14*** 0.47** 0.47*** 0.48** 
 (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.22)  
Lavdist  0 .54***  0 .82*** 1.29*** 
 (0.15)   (0 .00)  (0.23)  
Avborder  0.00**  0 .00*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00)   (0 .00)  (0.00)  
Avll  -0 .10***  -0.13*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03)   (0 .00)  (0.05)  
Avcl  -0.01  -0.41*** -0.40 
 (0.26)   (0 .00)  (0.33)  
Avemu 0.24** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.08)  
Aveu -0.75*** -0.28** -0.28*** -0.27** 
 (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.01)  (0.12)  
Avea 0.30 -0.04 -0.04*** -0.04 
 (0.23)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.10)  
hc1 0.09***  0 .09*** 0.08* 
 (0.03)   (0 .00)  (0.05)  
hc2 0.00    
 (0 .00)     
hc3 -0.17*** -0.05 -0.05*** -0.05* 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
Observat ions 5262 5262 5262 5262 
R-squared 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.85 
Robust  s tandard errors  in  parentheses    
*  s ignif icant  a t  10%; ** s ignif icant  a t  5%; *** s ignif icant  a t  1%    
Source:  Own calculat ions.  
 
Table 3: Overall EMU impact for the CEECs in 2004a  
 Estimations based on  the ful l  country sample 
Estimations based on non CEEC 
country sample (Out-of-sample)  
 in  % in 1000 US$b in  % in 1000 US$b 
Czech Republic  1,34% 383588 10,91% 1369448 
Estonia  18,54% 299772 20,16% 754332 
Hungary 17,75% 2140202 40,75% 2046566 
Latvia  -21,59% -600630 -19,93% -1293611 
Lithuania -15,26% -567905 -8,78% -654264 
Poland -34,24% -13739268 -19,00% -8129648 
Slovak Republic  -4,39% -309540 11,21% 425655 
Slovenia  52,12% 4230501 66,51% 8336747 
a  Table entr ies  d isplay the cumulated imports  of  the euro area from a specif ic  CEEC.  
b  Differences  = counterfactual  scenar io minus basel ine scenar io.   
Source:  Own calculat ions.  
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Tabelle 4: Spearman rank correlation between openness and EMU effect 
 Full  sample 
Full  sample excl .  
CEECs (Out-of-
sample)  
2004 0,45 0,55 
1991-2004 0,54*** 0,54*** 
* s ignif icant  a t  10%; ** s ignif icant  a t  5%; *** s ignif icant  a t  1% 
Source:  Own calculat ions.  
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A.1 Variable definitions and sources  
 
Table A.1: List of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
ijtM  Yearly imports of country i 
from country j  
OECD ITCS 
tjiY )(  Importer and exporter GDP (in 
current US$) 
UN NAMAD 
ijtre  Bilateral real exchange rate  UN NAMAD (nom. exchange 
rates), IMF IFS (producer price 
index) 
ijD  Great circle distance between 
the two countries of a trading 
pair  
CIA World Factbook (latitudes 
and longitudes), own 
calculations based on the 
harvesine formula 
ijLL  Dummy = 1 for one country and 
= 2 for both countries of the 
trading pair being landlocked 
CIA World Factbook 
ijB  Dummy controlling for the 
length of a common border 
CIA World Factbook 
ijCL  Dummy controlling for the 
number of common official 
languages 
CEPII 
ijtEMU ,  
ijtEU ,  
ijtEA  
Dummy = 1 for both countries 
of a trading pair being EMU, 
EU or EA members  
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